Abstract
Now that stem cell scientists are clamouring for human eggs for cloning-based stem cell research, there is vigorous debate about the ethics of paying women for their eggs.
Generally speaking, some claim that women should be paid a fair wage for their reproductive labour or tissues, while others argue against the further commodification of reproductive labour or tissues and worry about voluntariness among potential egg providers. Siding mainly with those who believe that women should be financially compensated for providing eggs for research, the new stem cell guidelines of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) legitimize both reimbursement of direct expenses, and financial compensation for many women who supply eggs for research. In this paper, we do not attempt to resolve the thorny issue of whether payment for eggs used in human embryonic stem cell research is ethically legitimate. Our goal is more modest. We want to show specifically that the ISSCR recommended payment practices are deeply flawed and, more generally, that all payment schemes that aim to avoid the undue inducement of women risk the global exploitation of economically disadvantaged women.
In December 2006, the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) -a scientific membership organization for stem cell scientists, laboratories, and biotechnology companies -released its Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (hereafter the ISSCR Guidelines) (International Society, 2006) . One of the ethically controversial issues addressed in the ISSCR Guidelines is financial compensation for women who provide eggs used to create research embryos for stem cell science. Significantly, this issue is one of the few on which authors of the ISSCR Guidelines did not readily agree (Daley et al, 2007) . Some argued that altruism alone should motivate women to provide eggs for research, and that even reimbursement of direct expenses could result in abuse. Others insisted that it would be both unfair and exploitative to have women bear the potential harms of hormonal stimulation and surgical egg retrieval without financial compensation.
In the end, the authors of the ISSCR Guidelines agreed to the following. "Except when specifically authorized by the SCRO [Stem Cell Research Oversight] process, no reimbursement of direct expenses or financial considerations of any kind may be provided for donating embryos or gametes that have been generated in the course of clinical treatment and are in excess of clinical need or deemed of insufficient quality for clinical use." (International Society 2006, 11.5a ) Here, the ISSCR Guidelines essentially take a prohibitive stance toward paying women in fertility treatment for their eggs (i.e., payment is not permitted, unless specifically authorized). This interpretation is consistent with the language that the Guidelines use to describe these women: they are egg donors.
In sharp contrast, women whose eggs are collected outside of treatment are egg providers, and paying them is permitted. The Guidelines suggest that researchers should follow local practice regarding reimbursement for research participation and use the usual local research ethics review process to "ensure that reimbursement of direct expenses or financial considerations of any kind do not constitute an undue inducement" (International Society, 2006, 11.5b) . Here, the Guidelines take a permissive stance towards paying women outside of treatment to provide eggs for research (i.e., payment is permitted, provided there is no undue inducement). By permitting reimbursement of direct expenses and other financial compensation for eggs for stem cell research from some women, the ISSCR Guidelines distinguish themselves from other guidelines and laws that prohibit payment for eggs.
1 Presumably, the purpose of allowing such payments is, in part at least, to increase the number of women who give their eggs to stem cell researchers.
In this paper, we critically examine the ISSCR strategy for recruiting women as egg providers for stem cell research. First, we consider the presumed global shortage of eggs available to create embryos for stem cell research using somatic cell nuclear transfer technology (hereafter cloning technology). 2 We accept that altruistic giving is unlikely to provide the hoped-for number of eggs for cloning-based stem cell research. But, at the same time, we question whether cloning research is necessary to the development of safe 1 Examples of these guidelines and laws are the National Research Council guidelines (2005) and laws in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland (Gerber 2007 ), California (2006 , France (2006) , South Korea (2005), and Canada (2004) . 2 Human cloning involves the insertion of nuclear DNA from a human somatic cell into an enucleated human egg that is then activated so that it starts dividing, becoming an embryo from which stem cell lines can be derived.
and effective stem cell therapeutics, and therefore whether a recruitment strategy for egg providers with payment as an incentive is necessary to the pursuit of stem cell research and therapeutics.
Second, we review the different stances in the ISSCR Guidelines with respect to paying women whose eggs are collected inside versus outside the course of clinical treatment.
We discuss possible reasons for the difference and find each of these reasons wanting. A crucial underlying assumption in the debate about the need for eggs for cloning-based stem cell research is that the research is necessary for the development of safe and effective stem cell therapies. An oft-cited reason for this type of stem cell research is the need to develop personalized stem cell lines for transplantation into patients, in order to avoid the potential harms of immune rejection. Yet the benefit of personalized stem cell lines is questionable as the risk of immune rejection with embryonic stem cells has yet to be confirmed. (Baylis 2005; Giacomini et al., 2007) In fact, evidence suggests that stem cell-derived tissues are less likely to provoke host immuno-rejection than other transplantable tissues. (Medicetty, et al., 2004; Weiss, et al., 2003) If, however, the evidence did eventually confirm a significant risk of immune rejection, cloning-based stem cell research would not be the only (and might not be the best) solution to this problem. Alternatives, suggested by Jamie Thomson, include "…banking cell lines with defined major histocompatibility complex backgrounds or genetically manipulating ES cells to reduce or actively combat immune rejection." (Thomson, 1998) More recently, Snyder and Loring offer a more comprehensive critique of cloning-based stem cell research. They briefly describe the putative benefits of this research then dismiss each benefit in turn, thereby suggesting that at best, the need for cloning-based stem cell research is uncertain: As outlined above, the ISSCR Guidelines treat the selling of eggs to researchers differently depending on whether the eggs are "generated in the course of clinical treatment" or not (11.5a). More specifically, the ISSCR Guidelines include different prescriptions for these two scenarios. For women who donate eggs collected during treatment, payment is not the norm, but rather requires specific authorization. In contrast, women who are not in treatment are research participants and, as such, they are to be financially compensated in a manner consistent with research compensation practices in effect in the relevant jurisdiction. The ISSCR Guidelines also refer to 'undue inducement' with the second group of women, but do not even mention this possibility when discussing payment for the first group (i.e., women in treatment). Presumably for the first group (women who donate eggs collected during treatment), undue inducement would be a topic for discussion during a SCRO process initiated for the purpose of authorizing an exception payment. Nonetheless, failure to name this concern explicitly for these women is surprising, especially given that elsewhere in the ISSCR Guidelines, there is evident concern about the coercion and exploitation of women undergoing fertility treatment who are asked to provide eggs for stem cell research. Consider in particular this directive: "Wherever possible, the treating physician or infertility clinician should not also be the investigator who is proposing to perform research on the donated materials." (International Society 2006, 11.4) The worry here is with the potential harms of coercion and exploitation.
The ISSCR Guidelines themselves do not explain the different directives about financial compensation for women who provide eggs for stem cell research, depending upon whether the eggs are collected in or out of treatment. The thought, however, seems to be that women who are not fertility patients would not otherwise bear the burdens of time and inconvenience, or the potential harms of superovulation and egg retrieval. Since they experience these potential burdens and harms solely by virtue of their participation in research, they should be eligible for financial compensation, just as healthy volunteers for other types of research would be eligible for compensation.
Presumably no similar financial obligation exists towards women who are infertility patients and who elect to provide eggs for research, because they independently agree to all that egg collection involves; they do so for their own benefit in the hope of establishing a pregnancy. Absent their participation in research (i.e., absent a decision to provide eggs for research), they would still have the time investment, inconvenience, and potential harms associated with superovulation and egg retrieval. So they have done nothing specific to earn financial compensation. For this reason, no payment need be provided to women in fertility treatment. And presumably, exception payments "authorized by the SCRO process" need only be sought when there is a perceived need for payment as a motivating factor. (International Society 2006, 11.5a) A second possible explanation for the ISSCR position is a utilitarian desire to minimize potential harm to women by not encouraging those who are at greatest risk of harm-i.e., female infertility patients-to assume this risk for financial compensation. On this view, the potential harm to infertility patients who provide eggs to stem cell researchers is greater than the potential harm to healthy volunteers (i.e., women who are not in clinical treatment). With both groups of women there are the initial potential physical harms associated with superovulation and egg retrieval. With infertility patients, however, there are additional potential psychological and physical harms if they do not become pregnant in the cycle in which they sold eggs for research. To explain: female infertility patients are producing eggs, first and foremost, for their own reproductive use. If they do not become pregnant after having sold some of their eggs for research (particularly if those eggs were deemed suitable for transfer), and they attribute their failed treatment to their decision to sell some of their eggs, then they could experience psychological harm. As well, if they decide to undergo additional superovulation and egg retrievals in the hope of achieving a pregnancy, they could experience additional physical harms. These additional harms do not apply to women who provide eggs for research collected outside the course of treatment.
A third possible reason for the ISSCR policy difference on payment for eggs is a concern about the greater potential harm of undue inducement with paying infertility patients.
Fertility treatment is expensive and, for some, cost-prohibitive. The only way to access IVF might be to agree in advance to sell some of one's eggs for research.
While these reasons for the ISSCR policy difference seem plausible, they do not amount to a principled defense of a fair policy. Women who provide eggs collected in treatment are not so unlike women who provide eggs collected outside of treatment that there ought to be different guidelines with respect to paying for their eggs.
First, while it is certainly true that infertility patients accept the potential harms of superovulation and egg retrieval for their own benefit, their decision to assume these potential harms also benefits researchers who are provided with some of the eggs. More generally, the fact that infertility patients accept certain potential harms irrespective of whether they are benefiting researchers or are financially compensated is irrelevant to whether they should be compensated. Consider the following analogy. A writer who would write even if the public did not appreciate her work and would not pay for her writings is nonetheless still entitled to make money from her work. One does not lose a legitimate right to compensation by virtue of a willingness to act without compensation.
Second, one could argue that greater potential physical and psychological harms to infertility patients of selling their eggs entitles them to at least as much financial compensation than that which is available to women who are not in treatment. Usually, forms of labour that involve serious potential harms are compensated favourably because of the harm and in a way that is commensurate with it. To reiterate and expand on the potential harms for infertility patients of offering up their eggs to stem cell researchers, consider that to maximize the chance of pregnancy, all eggs produced in one cycle should be exposed to sperm to obtain a maximum number of fertilized eggs (assuming that with responsible ovarian stimulation, women would not produce an inordinate number of eggs per cycle). Eggs that do not fertilize (and otherwise would be discarded) would become eligible for research, as would fertilized eggs deemed 'unsuitable for transfer' (and thus Third, while we certainly believe that undue inducement is a worry for women undergoing fertility treatment, we do not accept that the risk of it is necessarily higher for these women than for women who provide eggs collected outside of clinical treatment (it may or may not be higher.) Offers of money amount to undue inducement when they are enough to get people to "discount [any] risks to themselves and to make decisions they will later regret" (Steinbock 2004, 262) . With women seeking IVF, the concern about offering them money for their eggs in exchange for a reduced rate on treatment is that their psychological need to get pregnant will trump any concern about potential harms (i.e., the potential physical and psychological harms of IVF). Supposedly, the same sort of problem does not arise, at least not with the same frequency, in the context of offering money to women for eggs collected outside of treatment. But this line of reasoning is problematic for two reasons. First, it presumes a level of desperation among women seeking fertility treatment that is not borne out by the relevant psychological literature; the literature does not show that on the whole, these women are so obsessed with getting pregnant that they would simply ignore potential harms to themselves (see, e.g., Greil 1997). Second, desires that motivate women outside the course of clinical treatment to sell their eggs could be just as intense and overwhelming as a desire to get pregnant after a long period of infertility. Examples include desires to avoid a crushing credit-card debt, to pay tuition or pay off student loans, to feed and clothe one's children, and to be able to pay for medical treatment for oneself or a loved one. On average, then, undue inducement could be the same for both groups of women.
To this point, we have shown that different assumptions about payment for eggs in the ISSCR Guidelines are unfair. In any scheme in which women benefit financially from providing eggs to stem cell researchers, women should benefit equally regardless of What about offering the same payments to women from poorer nations? Surely, the women would be unduly induced by these offers, given the local economy. women, but also many poor women? Are these researchers to track the socio-economic status of all egg sellers and then endeavour to meet a certain quota for women in different economic strata? Or, do these researchers only need to show that their recruitment strategies do not purposely target economically disadvantaged women, and any imbalance in participation between the rich and the poor is simply to be expected (i.e., natural) given that wealthy women would hardly be motivated to sell their eggs for stem
cell research for what to them would be little money.
In cautioning researchers against undue inducement (at least of some women), the authors of the ISSCR Guidelines accept that the price of eggs for stem cell research will be a function of geography, and will vary as the price of eggs for fertility treatment does now. Such inequality creates an incentive for researchers to obtain eggs from poor women more often than from wealthy women. Moreover, the ISSCR Guidelines do not do enough to prevent researchers from acting on this incentive, that is, from acting in a way that the authors themselves deem to be ethically problematic.
Conclusion
Since we do not accept unchallenged the claim that cloning-based stem cell research is necessary for the development of successful stem cell therapies, we are not sympathetic to the oft-repeated claim that there is a chronic shortage of eggs needed for cloning-based stem cell research. It follows that we are not inclined to look favorably upon payment schemes aimed at increasing the number of eggs available for this research. In our view, egg production and collection are potentially very harmful activities for women and without clear evidence of significant potential benefit, there is no favorable harm-benefit ratio that justifies asking women to assume the potential harms (for the sake of research or for any other end).
In addition to the potential physical and psychological harms of egg production and collection, there are the potential harms of undue inducement and of exploitation inherent in any system of payment for eggs. (Indeed, were it not for these potential harms, it would be relatively simple and, for some, uncontroversial to set a fair price for women's labour in producing eggs for research). To avoid the potential harms of undue inducement and exploitation, some system other than the one outlined in the ISSCR Guidelines is needed. These Guidelines wrongly fail to specify that women ought to be treated equally regardless of whether their eggs are collected inside or outside of fertility treatment. As well, the Guidelines fail to appreciate the tension that exists between the directives not to offer women financial compensation that would constitute undue inducement, and not to exploit economically disadvantaged women. In the contexts of global science (where the mobility of researchers is not constrained) and global markets (where human cells and tissues can be imported and exported, with or without profit), these directives cannot meaningfully coexist. To avoid unduly inducing women from poorer nations to undergo superovulation and egg retrieval, one would have to keep payments small; but in doing so, one creates the problem of these women being exploited. Yet by increasing payments to try to eliminate the exploitation and to equalize payments between rich and poor women, one reintroduces the problem of undue inducement.
The only straightforward way to avoid the harms of undue inducement and of exploitation is to have a system of altruistic donation (with compensation for direct receipted expenses) and to accept that if women are not inclined to be selfless with their eggs and with the effort it takes to produce them, then eggs for stem cell research will be in short supply.
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